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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction
of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78-2-2(4)
(1988).
Appellant's appeal is from a final judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
dated December 7, 1988.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Was the trial court correct in holding that the

original (December 1985) Trustee's Sale, which followed a
partially inaccurate Notice of Default, valid and therefore the
subsequent (April 16, 1986) Trustee's Sale was of no effect?
2.

Was the trial court justified in awarding

attorneys' fees and costs to defendants who prevailed on the
only contested issue, although a judgment resulted in favor of
plaintiff?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts were stipulated to at the
beginning of the trial or were found as a result of the trial:

1.

Defendants were involved in developing and

building housing projects.

On January 28, 1983, they obtained

a loan for $825,000 from R. Richards Woodbury, Mortgage
Corp., secured by a Trust Deed on certain real property located
in Uintah County, Utah.

The Trust Deed identified defendants

as trustors; it was dated January 28, 1983 and recorded
February 2, 1983, in Book 325 at Page 133, as Document

No. 199115 of the Records of the Uintah County Recorder.
loan was subsequently assigned to plaintiff.

The

(Plaintiff's

First Amended Complaint, para. 3; Defendants' Answer, para. 3;
Plaintiff's Exhibit "2" Multi-Family Deed of Trust.)
2.

Defendants fell behind in their obligation to

pay the debt and on July 26, 1985, plaintiff caused a Notice of
Default to be recorded.

The Notice of Default identified the

Trust Deed as No. 199115, stated the name of the defendants as
trustors, gave the Book No. as 325, and the Page No. as 13 3.
The Notice also gave an incomplete description of the
property.

(See Court Transcript, p. 4, lines 5-12; Plaintiff's

Exhibit "4.")
3.

Plaintiff caused an Amended Notice of Default

to be filed on September 9, 1985, which contained a complete
description of the property.

(See Court Transcript, p. 4,

lines 13-18; Plaintiff's Exhibit
4.

V5.")

A Notice of Sale containing a complete

description of the property was mailed to defendants on
November 13, 1985, scheduling a trustee's sale for December 16,
1985.

(See Court Transcript, p. 4, lines 19-21; Plaintiff's

Exhibit "6," Notice of Trustee's Sale.)
5.

More than the required three months had

transpired between the date of the Notice of Default (July 26,
1985) and the Notice of Sale (November 13, 1985).

Slightly

more than two months had expired between the date of the
-2-

Amended Notice of Default (September 9, 1985) and the Notice of
Sale.
6.

On December 16, 1985, the Trustee's Sale was

held, and the only bid entered was by plaintiff in the amount
of $983,086.33, resulting in a deficiency of about $7,000.00.
(See Court Transcript, p. 4, lines 22-25; p. 10, lines 6-12.)
7.

Plaintiff did not record a trustee's deed

from the sale, but did file a deficiency notice within three
months of the December 16, 1985 Trustee's Sale.
8.

Plaintiff initiated a second Notice of Sale

in March 1986, three months after the Trustee's Sale of
December 1985, announcing a second Trustee's Sale to be held
April 16, 1986. Plaintiff was the only bidder at the second
sale, entering a bid of only $400,000 in this effort to
purchase the property a second time.

(See Court Transcript, p.

5, lines 1-10.)
9.

Plaintiff filed an Amended Deficiency Notice

claiming the second sale was valid, asking for a deficiency
judgment of $608,287.61 based on the second sale.
10.

Defendants defended by contending that the

original Notice of Default was sufficient to impart notice of
the property at issue, and also that plaintiff could not take
advantage of any technical defect in the Notice to set aside
the original sale.

Defendants claimed the original sale was

the valid sale and stipulated at trial to the $7,339.44
-3-

deficiency from that sale when that issue was raised for the
first time at trial by plaintiff.
11.

The trial court held that the December 1985

sale was valid, and that therefore the April 1986 sale was of
no effect.

The court entered a judgment for the $7,339.44

stipulated as the deficiency from the December 1985 sale.

The

court also awarded attorneys1 fees and costs to defendants of
$4,451.98 to be offset against the $7,339.44.

(See Court

Transcript, p. 10, lines 6-14.) The court also noted that
plaintiff had recovered attorneys1 fees accrued to the date of
sale in the amount stipulated as owed by defendants at the date
of sale.

(See Court Transcript p. 11, lines 1-9.)
12.

The court based its ruling on its finding

that the original Notice of Default imparted sufficient notice
of the object of the default and on the Utah Supreme Court
decision of Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Serv.,
743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987).

(See Court Transcript, p. 4, lines

1-4.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Third District Court decision that the December
16, 1985 trustee's sale was valid because the Amended Notice
of Default did not affect the three-month notice period in any
way, was justified for each of two reasons.

-4-

First, the statute controlling the Notice of Default,
Utah Code Ann, §57-1-24, does not require a complete property
description since the Trust Deed was identified correctly with
the information specified by the statute.
Second, even if the property description were not
complete, the omission was not a material irregularity
sufficient to set aside the completed sale, because the purpose
of §57-1-24 is to protect the defendants' property rights, and
the defendants did not claim any harm from the process.
Defendants also argue that the award to them of
attorneys1 fees and costs was proper since they were the
prevailing parties with regard to the only contested issue.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
DECEMBER 1985 TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS VALID BECAUSE THE
NOTICE OF DEFAULT FILED JULY 26, 1985, CONFORMED TO
THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-24 (1967).
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (1967), Sale of Trust
Property by Trustee - Notice of Default, provides:
The power of sale herein conferred upon the
trustee shall not be exercised until:
(a) the trustee shall file first for
record, in the office of the recorder
of each county wherein the trust
property or some part or parcel
thereof is situated, a notice of
default, identifying the Trust Deed
by stating the name of the trustor
-5-

named therein and giving the book and
page where the same is recorded or
a description of the trust property,
and containing a statement that a
breach of an obligation for which the
trust property was conveyed as
security has occurred and setting
forth the nature of such breach and of
his election to sell or cause to be
sold such property to satisfy the
obligation.
(b) not less than three months shall
thereafter elapse; and
(c) after the lapse of at least three
months the trustee shall give notice
of sale as provided in this act.
(Emphasis added.)
Notice of Default was filed in the case at bar on
July 26, 1985.

The Notice complied with the requirements of

§57-1-24 because it "identified the Trust Deed by stating the
name of the trustor and gave the book and page where the same
was recorded."

The "or" preceding "description of the trust

property" in §57-1-24(a) makes description of the property
optional, to be provided if the Trust Deed is not identified as
required.

An incomplete property description supplied in the

notice in addition to the required information did not negate
the sufficiency of the notice nor defeat the purpose of the
statute.
The purpose of the strict notice requirements in a
nonjudicial sale of property secured by a Trust Deed is to
"inform persons with an interest in the property of the pending

-6-

sale of that property so that they may act to protect those
interests."

Concepts, Inc. v, First Security Realty Serv.,

743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987).

The precise identification of

the Trust Deed met the statutory notice requirements and gave
defendants sufficient notice of the impending trustee's sale to
cure the default had they been able.
The trustee filed the Notice of Sale on November 13,
1985 after the required three-month waiting period, which the
court below calculated to have expired by October 25, 1985.
(See Court Transcript, p. 8, lines 12-20.)

The Notice of Sale

fully described the property to be sold, and that property was
sold on December 16, 1985, without objection by defendants,
whose interests the trustee's sale notice requirements are
intended to protect.
Defendants also argued that even if the incomplete
property description were found to be an irregularity in the
notice requirement of §57-1-24, such irregularity was
immaterial, and "immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect
the sufficiency of the notice or the sale made pursuant
thereto."

Concepts, Inc., 743 P.2d at 1159. Also, "a

trustee sale once made will not be set aside unless the
interests of the debtor were sacrificed or there was some
attendant fraud or unfair dealing."

Id. at 1160.

Having been put on notice by the July 1985 Notice of
Default that the entire loan balance was declared due,
-7-

defendants had no reason to expect anything but a complete sale
of the property conveyed by the Trust Deed.

Defendants did not

protest when the Notice of Sale was delivered to them slightly
less than three months after the Amended Notice of Default was
filed.
The Third District concluded the Amended Notice
"didn't affect in any way[,] shape or form the 90-day notice
period contemplated by the statute; didn't shorten it in any
way to the . . .defendants."

(See Court Transcript, p. 8,

lines 21-25.)
The plaintiff's argument that the omission in the
property description invalidates the sale, "perverts and uses
as a sword a statute that was meant to shield the property
rights of trustor [defendants]."
1160.

Concepts, Inc., 743 P.2d at

Only plaintiff took exception to the adequacy of the

notice, arguing for the validity of the unnecessary second
sale, which with four months of hindsight would allow plaintiff
to pay a substantially lower price than plaintiff bid at the
first sale.
The plaintiff has not been deprived of the benefit of
its bargain by validation of the December 1985 sale.

The Third

District found that plaintiff received an accurate Notice of
Sale fully describing the property to be sold, and that there
was nothing in the December 1985 sale which would have misled
any buyer as to what was up for auction.
-8-

(See Court

Transcript, p. 9, lines 23-25; p. 10, lines 1-5.)

Plaintiff,

who initiated the Trustee's Sale, had ample opportunity to
appraise the value of the property before bidding at the
December 1985 sale, where plaintiff was the only bidder.

The

stipulated facts show that the loan in which plaintiff acquired
a beneficial interest was made on the basis of an eighty
percent loan-to-value ratio in January of 1983. Therefore,
plaintiff's bid of approximately the outstanding loan balance
was a logical bid in December 1985. The Third District also
found that the "record is absent of any evidence of fraud."
(See Court Transcript, p. 6, lines 24-25.)
The July 1985 Notice of Default complied with the
requirements of §57-1-24. The incomplete description of
property was either of no effect or was an immaterial error in
the notice.

The defendants, whom the statute is intended to

protect, did not protest the irregularity in the notice, and
allowed the sale to go forward without objection.

The

incomplete description did not harm the plaintiff, who
initiated the procedure and had ample opportunity to appraise
the value of the property before making a bid at the December
1985 sale.

No evidence of fraud was presented at trial. The

decision of the Third District Court that the December 1985
sale was valid should therefore be upheld.

-9-

II.
THE AWARD FOR ATTORNEYS1 FEES TO THE DEFENDANTS
WAS PROPER AS THE DEFENDANTS WERE THE
PREVAILING PARTIES.
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 (1985) provides that "in
any action brought under this section, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to collect his costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees incurred . . . "

(Emphasis added.)

A party may be the prevailing party if he is
successful with regard to the main issues.
Carlson, 511 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Alaska 1973).

Cooper v.
"It has been

established by case law that the prevailing party is the one
who successfully prosecutes the action or successfully defends
against it, prevailing on the main issue."

Id.

A party who is successful in defeating a claim of
great potential liability may be the prevailing party even
though the other side is successful in receiving an affirmative
recovery.

Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C.R. Lewis Co., 497

P.2d 312 (Alaska 1972).

In Owen Jones, the defendant Lewis

was awarded attorneys1 fees for having successfully defended
against a contract claim of $119,663.12, even though recovery
against Lewis of $7,363.12 was permitted in quantum meruit
for material salvaged.

The plaintiffs in Owen Jones

contended that only they could be the prevailing parties
because of their affirmative recovery of $7,3 63.12 at the
-10-

conclusion of the trial.

But, the court did not agree; "it is

not an immutable rule that the party who obtains an affirmative
recovery must be considered the prevailing party."

Id. at

313-14.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff's entire claim for
relief was based on the invalid Trustee's Sale of April 1986
and the alleged deficiency said to have resulted.

(See First

Amended Complaint, paras. 9, 11, 12; Plaintiff's Trial
Memorandum, Record at p. 000072.)

Defendants asserted that the

property was sold at the prior and valid Trustee's Sale of
December 1985.
p. 000072.)

(See Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum, Record at,

Defendants stipulated to the $7,339.44 deficiency

from the December 1985 sale as soon as plaintiff indicated that
it claimed a small deficiency from the first sale and for the
first time presented the calculation at trial.

Since the court

below held the December 1985 sale to be valid (see Court
Transcript, p. 10, lines 6-10), and therefore the April 1986
sale to be invalid, the defendants prevailed on the main and
only contested issue, even though an affirmative judgment for
$7,3 39.44, which was stipulated, was entered against defendants.
The decision of the court below to award attorneys'
fees to defendants is also supported by Utah Code Ann.
§57-1-27 (1985), which provides in part that:
Each bid is considered an irrevocable
offer, and if the purchaser refuses to pay
the amount bid by him for the property sold
-11-

to him at the sale . . . . the party
refusing to pay the bid price is liable for
any loss occasioned by the refusal
including interest, costs
and trustees1 and
1
reasonable attorneys fees. (Emphasis
added.)
In the Answer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint,
defendants asked for attorneys' fees incurred in defending
against plaintiffs1 claim that the December 1985 sale was
invalid.

The defense of this action became necessary because

plaintiff failed to honor its successful bid at the December
1985 sale.

An award of attorneys' fees to defendants is

consistent with the statutes allowing such fees, and the
decision of the court below should be upheld.

CONCLUSION
The December 16, 1985 Trustee's Sale was valid
because the Trust Deed was properly identified in one of the
two alternative ways required by Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24, and
the incomplete property description included in the Notice
of Default filed July 26, 1985 was either of no effect or was
an immaterial error in the notice procedure.

The purpose of

Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 is to shield the rights of
defendants, and plaintiff cannot use the statute as a sword to
set aside the sale where there was no material error or
evidence of fraud.

-12-

The award of attorneys' fees and costs to defendants
as the prevailing parties was proper because defendants
prevailed on the main and only contested issue, even though an
affirmative judgment of $7,339.44, which was stipulated, was
entered against defendants.
The judgment of the Third District Court below should
be upheld on both issues.
DATED this

J
Z^
L-'

day of June, 1989.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

Davies
:ney for Defendants/
Respondents

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage
prepaid on this (p^
day of June, 1989, to the following
counsel of record:
Glen W. Roberts
Walker Kennedy III
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
2 677 East Parleys Way
Salt Lake City,AUtaffix84109
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APPENDIX "A"

Woodbury Bettilyon and Kesler
353 East 200 South, SLC, UT 84111
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NOTICE OF DEFAULT
The undersigned, ASSOCIATED TITLE CO., Trustee, hereby gives
Notice of Default and of the exercise of its election to declare all sums
secured by the Trust Deed hereinafter described to be immediately due
and payable.
This notice relates to a Trust Deed executed by, DANIEL S. MEHR &
KATHRYN C. MEHR, DANIEL S. MEHR II & DEBORAH L. MEHR as Trustor, ASSOCIATED
TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, and RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORP., as
Beneficiary, dated January 28, 1983, recorded February 2, 1983, in Book 325
at Page 133, as Document No. 199115 of the records of the Uintah, County
Recorder, covering the following described property to-wit:
PARCEL I
Beginning 65 rods East and 317 feet North of the South quarter corner
of Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and running thence East 125 feet; thence South 70 feet;
thence West 125 feet; thence North 70 feet to the place of beginning,
and being within the unplatted part of Vernal City, Uintah County,
Utah.
Beginning 65 rods East and 220 feet North of the South quarter corner
of Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and running thence North 27 feet; thence East 125 feet;
thence North 70 feet thence East 117.2 feet, more or less, to the East
line of the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter section of said
section; thence South 152 feet; thence West 125 feet, more or less, to
the East property line of Robert Lowell Robbins and Ardith H. Robbins
as acquired by Warranty Deed, recorded November 11, 1971, as Entry No.
127337, in Book 172, at Page 112 of official records, thence North 55
feet; thence West 105 feet to the place of beginning, and being within
the unplatted part of Vernal City, Uintah County, Utah.
Parcel 2
Beginning 23 rods North of the Southeast corner of the Southwest
quarter of the Southeast quarter, Section 23, Township 4 South, Range
21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 242.13
feet; thence South 3 rods 13 feet; thence East 242.13 feet more or
less to the l/16th line; thence North 3 rods 13 feet to the place of
beginning.
This Trust Deed was assigned to OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL SAVINGS
BANK formerly known as NEBRASKA SAVING and LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A.

r

2
1

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

Xf
A breach of an obligation for which the trust property was conveyed
as security, has occurred consisting of the following: Payments for
January through July, 1985, for a total delinquency of $83,128.24, are due
and payable. Said breach can be cured by payment of said sum, plus
additional payments and interest that may accrue hereafter.
In the event of your failure to cure said breach within ninety days
after the recording of this Notice of Default, the Beneficiary shall and
does hereby elect to exercise its option to declare all sums secured by the
Trust Deed above described to be immediately due and payable without
further notice to you. At the ena of said ninety day period the Trustee
elects to sell or cause to be sold such property to satisfy the obligation
due under the note.
You are further advised of your right to bring a court action to
assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense you may have
to the acceleration and sale of the property.
By reason of such default, OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL
SAVINGS BANK fka NEBRASKA SAVING, the present beneficiary under
said Trust Deed, has executed and delivered to Trustee a written
Declaration of Default and demand for sale and has deposited with said
Trustee such Trust Deed and all documents evidencing obligations secured
thereby, and has declared and does hereby declare all sums secured
thereby immediately due and payable, and has elected and does hereby
elect to cause the trust properties to be sold to satisfy the obligations
secured thereby.
DATED this 18th day of July, 1985.

Verden E. Bettilyon
Attorney for Trustee
STATE OF Utah

)

COUNTY OF Salt Lake

)

/

)ss,

x\\, --On the* L8th day of July, 1985, personally appeared before me, Verden
v^£*.^Battilycn^\Attorney at Law, the signer of the foregoing instrument, who
^ 3 § 5 p k / y j w ^ ' g e to me that he executed the same.
-y***-*

j ~ " •*£>

' ^ V Commission Expires: 5-18-89
te'Sidi-ntjVat: Bountiful, Utah

n&JUt^ep i4&bfc&jff^
Notary Public
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When recorded return to:
Verden E. Bettilyon
Woodbury Bettilyon and Kesler
2677 East Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
AMENDED NOTICE OF DEFAULT
The undersigned, ASSOCIATED TITLE CO., Trustee, hereby gives Notice
of Default and of the exercise of its election to declare all sums secured
by the Trust Deed hereinafter described to be immediately due and payable.
This notice relates to a Trust Deed executed by, DANIEL S. MEHR &
KATHRYN C. MEHR, DANIEL S. MEHR II & DEBORAH L. MEHR as Trustor, ASSOCIATED
TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, and RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORP., as
Beneficiary, dated January 28, 1983, recorded February 2, 1983, in Book 325
at Page 133, as Document No. 199115 of the records of the Uintah, County
Recorder, covering the following described property to-wit:
PARCEL I
Beginning 65 rods East and 317 feet North of the South quarter corner of
Secticn 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and running thence East 125 feet; thence South 70 feet; thence West 125
feet; thence North 70 feet to the place of beginning, and being within the
unplatted part of Vernal City, Uintah County, Utah.
Beginning 65 rods East and 220 feet North of the South quarter corner of
Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and running thence North 27 feet; thence East 125 feet; thence North 70
feet thence East 117.2 feet, more or less, to the East line of the
Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter section of said section; thence
South 152 feet; thence West 125 feet, more or less, to the East property
line of Robert Lowell Robbins and Ardith H. Robbins as acquired by Warranty
Deed, recorded November 11, 1971, as Entry No. 127337, in Book 172, at Page
112 of official records, thence North 55 feet; thence West 105 feet to the
place of beginning, and being within the unplatted part of Vernal City,
Uintah County, Utah.
Parcel 2
Beginning 23 rods North of the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of
the Southeast quarter, Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 242.13 feet; thence South 3
rods 13 feet; thence East 242.13 feet more or less to the l/16th line;
thence North 3 rods 13 feet to the place of beginning.
ALSO: Lots 21, 22 and 23 of the proposed CENTRAL PART, PLAT "A", a
subdivision located in Section 26 Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, in Uintah County, Utah.

EXHIBIT

! C s ^- ^ ^ .

415
This Trust Deed was assigned to OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL SAVINGS
BANK formerly known as NEBRASKA SAVING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A.
A breach of an obligation for which the trust property was conveyed as
security, has occurred consisting of the following: Payments for
January through July, 1985, for a total delinquency of $83,128,24, are due
and payable. Said breach can be cured by payment of said sum, plus
additional payments and interest that may accrue hereafter.
In the event of your failure to cure said breach within ninety days
after the recording of this Notice of Default, the Beneficiary shall and
does hereby elect to exercise its option to declare all sums secured by the
Trust Deed above described to be immediately due and payable without
further notice to you. At the end of said ninety day period the Trustee
elects to sell or cause to be sold such property to satisfy the obligation
due under the note.
You are further advised of your right to bring a court action to
assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense you may have to
the acceleration and sale of the property.
By reason of such default, OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK
formerly known as NEBRASKA SAVING and LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A., the present
beneficiary under said Trust Deed, has executed and delivered to Trustee a
written Declaration of Default and demand for sale and has deposited with
said Trustee such Trust Deed and all documents evidencing obligations
secured thereby, and has declared and does hereby declare all sums secured
thereby immediately due and payable, anG has elected and does hereby elect
to cause the trust properties to be sold to satisfy the obligations secured
thereby.
DATED this 6th day of September, 1985.

Verden E. Bettilyon
Attorney for Trustee

STATE OF Utah

)

COUNTY OF Salt Lake

)

)ss.
. ^>*"\ ./t73r>'the 6th day of September, 1985, personally appeared before me,
/ / ^ \ ^ P f i f e I l E^ B e t t i l y o n , Attorney at Law, the signer of the foregoing
K
^in%truiw^9
who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the same.
^^H^y/P^onajiiysTon Expires: 5-18-89
* V \ Keslthtig-'St: B o u n t i f u l , Utah

^n^d^tJ^
y ^ / ^ > - ^ ^ ^
Notary Public
*

APPENDIX "C"

NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE
The following described property will be sold at public auction to the
highest bidder, purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States
at the time of sale. The sale to be held at the 401 County Bid,, South
Door, Vernal, Utah 84078, County of Uintah, State of Utah, on December 16,
1985 at 12 Moon of said day for the purpose of foreclosing a Trust Deed
executed by DANIEL S. MEHR & KATHRYN C. MEHR, DANIEL S. MEHR II & DEBORAH
L. MEHR as Trustor, in favor of RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORP. as
Beneficiary; covering real property located in Uintah County, and more
particularly described as follows:
PARCEL I
Beginning 65 rods East and 317 feet North of the South quarter corner of
Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and running thence East 125 feet; thence South 70 feet; thence West 125
feet; thence North 70 feet to the place of beginning, and being within the
unplatted part of Vernal City, Uintah County, Utah.
Beginning 65 rods East and 220 feet North of the South quarter corner of
Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and running thence North 27 feet; thence East 125 feet; thence North 70
feet thence East 117.2 feet, more or less, to the East line of the
Southwest quarter of the Southeast auarter section of said section; thence
South 152 feet; thence West 125 feet, more or less, to the East property
line of Robert Lowell Robbins and Ardith H. Robbins as acquired by Warranty
Deed, recorded November 11, 1971, as Entry No. 127337, in Book 172, at Page
112 of official records, thence North 55 feet; thence West 105 feet to the
place of beginning, and being within the unplatted part of Vernal City,
Uintah County, Utah.
Parcel 2
Beginning 23 rods North of the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of
the Southeast quarter, Section 23, Townstiip 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 242.13 feet; thence South 3
rods 13 feet; thence East 242.13 feet more or less to the l/16th line;
thence North 3 rods 13 feet to the place of beginning.
ALSO: Lots 21, 22 and 23 of the proposed CENTRAL PART, PLAT "A", a
subdivision located in Section 26 Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, in Uintah County, Utah.
ADDRESS of Property: 429, 439, 449, 459 South 200 East; 823, 839, 875 South
50 East, Vernal, Utah.
This Trust Deed was assigned to OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL SAVINGS
BANK fka NEBRASKA SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A.
DATED this 13th day of November, 1985.
n e r ^ n E- lell}}y°n
~*"I J PLAINTIFFS
A J '
Woodbury, Bettilyon and Kesler I .EXHIBIT
Attorney for Trustee
II
/
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2
3
4

*

*

*

D) xv/7

OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA
FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK,

5
Plaintiff,
6
-vs-

Case

No.

C86-1905

7
8

DANIEL S. MEHR, KATHRYN C
MEHR, DANIEL S. MEHR II,
and DEBORAH L. MEHR,

DECISION

2-3-88

9
Defendants.
10
-11
12

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3rd day of

13

February, 1988, this cause came on for trial before

14

the HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, District Court, with a

15

jury in the Salt Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake

16

City, Utah.

17
18

A P P E A R A N C E S ;

19

For the Plaintiff:

JEFFREY C. SWINTON &
GLEN ROBERTS
Attorneys at Law
19 West South Temple #700
SLC, Utah
84101

For the Defendants:

LYNN S. DAVIES
P.O. Box 2465
SLC, Utah
84110

20
21
22
23
24
25

CAT by:

CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR
1

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

I had indicated

in chambers

3

my mental processes in terms of trying to rule on the

4

spot, and that doesn't mean that I have haven't

5

thoughtfully considered the issues because I've had at

6

least the benefit of an evening and all during the

7

day.

8

easy one, but I do have a firm recollection at the

9

pretrial hearing that it was clear at that time what

The decision I'm called upon to make is not an

10

Mr. Davies' principal point of attack would be.

11

so I don't think that comes as a great surprise on

12

what his major spear was.

13

short on the Concepts case, and that may be -- I can't

14

recall -- I don't have the file in front of me.

15

the pretrial was even before that decision issued, but

16

the decision was recent enough that that might explain

17

why he didn't know about* it.

18

And

The only thing he was just

MR. DAVIES:

Maybe

I think those were the

19

principal defenses we raised in our answer too, your

20

Honor.

All through, that's been our intention.

21
22

THE COURT:

Given that, the Court does

feel that there is sufficient guidance set forth to

23| the Court in the Concepts case that I'm

reasonably

24 I bound by, and I don't know that I'm particularly happy
25 I about it.

It puts the defendants in a favored
2

position that I'm not sure that they ought to be in.
Lenders lend money I suppose as
entrepreneurs like anyone else; taking the risk of
bust and boom and whatever, and that's a real thing to
a banker or an insurance company.
an interesting contrast.
was discussed

And I think there's

As I recall, First Security

in Forbes, and their poor performance

was discussed against a backdrop of portfolio real
estate investments, and that was contrasted with Zions
Bank that performed better on average because they had
opted to get into consumer credit in a bigger way.
Those bankers understand, and they ought
to understand, and they take those risks.

But in

addition to the property security and the real estate
cycles that take place, they also take their risks
based upon the personal integrity and value of the
personal and individual 'Signatures on those
obligations.

And if the defendants signed the

obligations, it wasn't only the property that was at
risk and your down payment that was at risk, it was
your personal fortunes and finances that were at risk
as well by the transaction.
So, to that extent, I've been very, very
troubled about the decision that I feel that I must
make.

Under the Concepts v. First Security
Realty Service case, I think the Court is compelled to
make the following findings, reach the following
cone lusions .
Consistent with the stipulation entered
into on the record by the attorneys at the outset of
the trial, the Court finds that on July 26 f 1985, a
notice of default, 90-day notice of default, was
recorded concerning the property in Uintah County.
That notice failed to describe one of the two parcels
of four-plexes involved in this case, the three-unit
piece of property.
The Court further finds that on
September 9, 1985, an amended notice of default went
out -- or was recorded describing both the parcels
including the four duplexes -- or the four,
four-plexes as well as the parcel with the three
four-plexes.
The Court finds that on November 13,
1985, a notice of trustee's sale went out setting up a
trustee's sale on December 16, 1985.
The Court finds that that sale went
forward, and at that sale, the plaintiff holding the
beneficial interest under the trust deed bid in the
property at $963,086.33.
4

1

Thereafter, the beneficiary -- or the

2

plaintiff holding the beneficial interest, in

3

reviewing the matter with the trustee, determined that

4

there was a defective procedure that had been

5

employed, and initiated a second series of notices,

6

the notice of default, the notice of sale, and went

7

through the process again; ultimately resulting in a

8

second sale of the properties in question on April the

9

16th, 1986.

10

At which sale, the plaintiff bid in the

property at $400,000.

-11

Consistent with the jury's findings, the

12

Court finds that on December 16, 1985, the fair market

13

value of the property was $425,000.

14

the stipulation of the parties, the amount of the

15

indebtedness including cost, fees and everything was

16

$970,425.77.

17

And based upon

The Court further finds consistent with

18

the jury's verdict that on April 16, 1985, the fair

19

market value was $375,000, that the amount due

20

including costs, fees and the costs of sale was in the

21

amount of $1,022,442.11.

22

The Court reserves the issue with

23

respect to fees and costs attributable to this

24

proceeding.

25

maybe I ought to make sure on the record.

It having an affidavit -- is that --

5

1
2

Does that 1,022,000 include the
affidavit submitted by plaintiffs?

3
4

MR. ROBERTS:
Honor.

5
6

THE COURT:
understanding

MR. DAVIES:

8

THE COURT:
understanding

That's-what your

is, Mr. Davies?

7

9

No, it doesn't, your

That's my understanding.
That's what your

is Mr. Davies, and at this point, you

10

have not submitted an affidavit and the Court gave you

11

five days leave to submit such affidavit.

12

MR. DAVIES:

13

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.
Going from there to the

14

specific findings I think I need to make under the

15

Concepts case, the first thing that pops out at the

16

Judge is not the first thing that popped out at Mr.

17

Davies; which may indicate that judges jump through

18

different hoops than advocates.

19

At page 1159 of the decision, the Court

20

points out that a party seeking to have a trustee sale

21

set aside for irregularity, for want of notice or

22

fraud has the burden of proving its contentions.

23

that's my starting point.

24 I

So

The Court specifically finds that the

25| record is absent of any evidence of fraud, and it's
6

1

absent

of any want of notice, and the Court

2

acknowledge

the

irregularity

The Court

3
talks about

the principle

5

times

6

provisions on a trustee's

7

extrajudicial

8

borrowers.

10
-11

assume that

sale pertaining

decision

to

for the benefit

or the obligor

to rely on strict

several

sale

in that context, the Court

it is the debtor

the position

the statutory

sales are created

And

default.

in several contexts

in the decision, that

9

in the notice of

observes that the

4

does

performance

of the

would
that's

with

in

those

12

notices unless there's

some -- there's one bit

of

13

language

setting

cases

14

which reach unjust

extremes.

15

conclude that

result

16

case would be an unjust

17

construction

18

in that

in here about

that

aside a sale

in

I suppose one

could

be reached

extreme, but

could
in this

I don't

of the statutes are meant

to be

think

the

applied

fashion.

19

The 90-day default

period

is set up

for

20

the benefit

of a delinquent

21

during

90 days under

22

opportunity

23

costs to that date and cure the default.

And

24

lender uses a trust deed

remedies;

25

namely treating

that

to bring

or obligor,

and

a trust deed, he has

the

current

debtor

delinquent

amounts

with alternative

it as a mortgage or as a trust
7

and

the

deed.

1

And by accepting the benefits of an extrajudicial sale

2

unsupervised by the Court, the lender gives up the

3

remedy that's given to the borrower of the 90-day

4

default period during which time a default can be

5

cured.

6

Once that's done, however, there is no

7

six-month redemptive provision as there is in the case

8

of a mortgage foreclosure.

9

within the 90 days plus the additional 30 days

And so if you can't redeem

10

awaiting sale, then any remedies of the borrower are

11

then foreclosed, and he's out the door.

12

The notice was given in this case of the

13

default, and was recorded July 26, 1985.

14

sale took place December 16, and the 90 days then did

15

not expire until October 26th -- or -- it's probably

16

described

17

probably the 25th of Ocbober of 1985, and then the

18

notice of trustee's sale took place in mid-November.

19

So you had your full 90-day period expire by the time

20

that first notice went out.

21

in terms of three months.

The first

It expired

The amendment to the notice of default

22

didn't affect in any way shape or form the 90-day

23

notice period contemplated by the statute; didn't

24

shorten it in any way to the debtors or obligors or

25

the defendants in this case.
8

1

So, accordingly, the Court concludes

2

that that amendment was a material defect in that

3

notice which in a legal sense vitiated the

4

effectiveness of the notice of default inasmuch as the

5

defendants 1 time to cure was not adversely affected in

6

any way shape or form.

7

The defendants were given the full

8

benefit of the 90-day default period.

9

a full -- as I recall the statute is 30 days on

10
-11
12
13

They were given

trustee' s sale.
Is that right?

You guys read every

chapter and verse.
MR. ROBERTS:

Actually, your Honor, it

14

provides that the publication was to occur three

15

times, and you can't make the sale --

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. ROBERTS:

Before that.
Before ten days has

18

expired from the last publication, it must be done in

19

20 days before that publication.

20

THE COURT:

So three weeks for the

21

notices, and another ten days gives you roughly a

22

month, and that full period of time hasn't expired.

23

When the notices of sale -- or the

24

notice of trustee sale went out, based upon the

25

stipulation, the Court would find that the property
9

1

notice was accurate, describing both parcels, and that

2

the subject of the sale was described accurately and

3

with particularity, and there could have been nothing

4

in the trustee's sale notice that would have misled

5

any buyer as to what was up for auction.

6

And because of that fact, the Court

7

concludes that sale number one was a legally valid

8

sale, and would order based upon the stipulations, the

9

judgment enter in favor of the plaintiff against

10

defendants for the approximate $7,000 attributable to

Til

the difference between the 963,086.33 and the

12

970 ,425.27.

13

The Court will award defendants their

14

costs and attorney's fees.

15

submit your affidavit with respect to fees and costs,

16

and the plaintiff has an additional five days to

17

object to that affidavit and those costs.

18

there's any substantial reason why those fees are not

19

justified, then the Court would intend to hold an

20

evidentiary hearing with respect to the reasonableness

21

of defendants' fees, and permit you to put on evidence

22

to justify those fees.

23

Anything else?

24

MR. ROBERTS:

25

You have five days to

And if

Are you not awarding

plaintiffs its costs and fees in the action?
10

THE COURT:

No.

It wouldn't follow.

I

think you had -- your fees and costs that are
reasonably allowable to the time of the sale, I had
the understanding that the 970,425.27 f which you
stipulated to, was the amount of the indebtedness plus
all of the costs of sale and attorney fees accrued as
to that date.

Is that inaccurate or -MR. ROBERTS:

Yes, accrued to that date

for the foreclosure.
THE COURT:

And beyond that, I would

award no fees other than to the defendants for the
lit igat ion.
Will you draft -- although we did submit
to the jury two general verdict forms, which was a
little unusual, but I think in a straight forward way
to get to the jury, as I indicated earlier, I think
the judgment is basically in the form of special
verdicts, and I assume you'd follow the rules in terms
of submitting a judgment.

And I think it ought to

contain those specific findings that I've made, and
also the fact that I found that there's an absence of
evidence in terms of plaintiff meeting its burden,
burdens of fraud and irregularity.

And I find that

the irregularity in question is not material inasmuch
as it did not impair the 90-day default period.

11

1
2

We'll be in recess.
(Hearing

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
12

adjourned.)

REPORTER.1 S , CERTIFICATE

3

STATE OF UTAH

4

County of SALT LAKE

ss
5
6

I, CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, do hereby certify that

7

I an an Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Notary

8

Public in and for the State of Utah;

9

That I took down the proceedings aforesaid at

10

the time and place therein named and thereafter

-11

reduced the same to print by means of computer-aided

12

transcription

13
14
15

(CAT) under my direction and control;

I further certify that I have no interest in
the event of this action.
WITNESS I1Y HAND AND SEAL this the 8th day of

16 I February, 1988.
17
18
19

(S ignatu re)
CARLTON Yi WAY/f C3R, RPR,
Notary Pub 1 ic vsLn_^!nd for the
State of Utah, residing at
Salt Lake City, Utah.

20
21
22
(Seal)
23
24

My commission expires:

25
13

11-18-90

APPENDIX "E"

57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee — Notice of default.
The power of sale herein conferred upon the trustee shall not be exercised
until:
(a) the trustee shall first file for record, in the office of the recorder of
each county wherein the trust property or some part or parcel thereof is
situated, a notice of default, identifying the trust deed by stating the
name of the trustor named therein and giving the book and page where
the same is recorded or a description of the trust property, and containing
a statement that a breach of an obligation for which the trust property
was conveyed as security has occurred, and setting forth the nature of
such breach and of his election to sell or cause to be sold such property to
satisfy the obligation;
(b) not less than three months shall thereafter elapse; and
(c) after the lapse of at least three months the trustee shall give notice
of sale as provided in this act.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 6; 1967, ch.
131, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Three-month time period.
Rule 601 of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition
shall operate as a stay of any act to enforce a
lien against property in custody of the bank-

ruptcy court, does not suspend the running of
the three-month time period required by this
section. McCarthy v. Lewis, 615 P.2d 1256
(Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 557.
Key Numbers. — Mortgages &* 346.

57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale — Description of property
— Time and place of sale.
(1) The trustee shall give written notice of the time and place of sale particularly describing the property to be sold (a) by publication of such notice, at
least three times, once a week for three consecutive weeks, the last publication to be at least 10 days but not more than 30 days prior to the sale, in some
newspaper having a general circulation in each county in which the property
to be sold, or some part thereof, is situated, and (b) by posting such notice, at
least 20 days before the date of sale, in some conspicuous place on the property
to be sold and also in at least three public places of each city or county in
which the property to be sold, or some part thereof, is situated.
404
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57-1-27

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 566.
Key Numbers. — Mortgages «= 354.

57-1-27, Sale of trust property by trustee — Public auction
— Conduct by attorney for trustee — Trustor
may direct order in which trust property sold —
Bids — Postponement of sale.
On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of sale, the
trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public auction
to the highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney for the trustee may conduct
the sale and act at such sale as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor in
interest, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which the trust property shall be sold when such property consists of several known lots or parcels
which can be sold to advantage separately, and the trustee, or the attorney for
the trustee, shall follow such directions. Any person, including the beneficiary
or trustee, may bid at the sale. Every bid is considered an irrevocable offer,
and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the property
sold to him at the sale, the trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may again
sell the property at any time to the highest bidder. The party refusing to pay
the bid price is liable for any loss occasioned thereby, including interest, costs,
and trustee's and reasonable attorney's fees. The trustee or the attorney for
the trustee may thereafter reject any other bid of such person.
The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he considers expedient,
postpone the sale up to a period not to exceed 72 hours. Notice of such postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at the
time and place last appointed for the sale. No other notice of the postponed
sale need be given unless the sale is postponed for longer than 72 hours
beyond the date designated in the notice of sale. In the event of a longer
postponement, the sale shall be cancelled and renoticed as provided for herein
in the same manner as the original notice of sale is required to be given.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 9; 1985, ch. 68,
I 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment m the first paragraph, inserted "or the
attorney for the trustee" in four places, incited "trustee, or the" at the beginning and
<M»ted "for the trustee" at the end of the second sentence, inserted "or trustee" in the
s jrth sentence, substituted "bid is considered"
l ar
^ l d shall be deemed" and "property sold"
(
• ^ "property struck off' m the fifth sentence,
«^»ded the former sixth sentence into the
Present sixth and seventh sentences by substiiuune "the bid price" for "shall be" near the
<nnning and adding "including interest,
f * * and trustee's and reasonable attorney's
'*-* at the end of the sixth sentence and delet-

ing "also, in his discretion" following "may" in
the seventh sentence; and, in the second paragraph, divided the former first sentence into
the present first and second sentences, substituted "considers" for "deems" and "up to a period not to exceed 72 hours" for "from time to
time until it shall be completed and, in every
such case, notice" at the end of the first sentence, divided the former second sentence into
the present third and fourth sentences, substituted "72 hours" for "one day" and "date" for
"day" near the middle of the third sentence,
and substituted "In the event of a longer postponement, the sale shall be cancelled and
renoticed as provided for herein" for "m which
event notice thereof shall be given" at the beginning of the fourth sentence.
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57-1-32

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59 C.J S. Mortgages § 550.
Key Numbers. — Mortgages <£= 334.

57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to recover balance due upon obligation for which
trust deed was given as security — Collection of
costs and attorney's fees.
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust
deed, a» hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which
such property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale.
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value at the
date of sale of the property sold. The court may not render judgment for more
than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs,
and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair
market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought
under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 14; 1985, ch.
68, ^ 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment deleted language from the end of the first

and third sentences; added the fourth sentence;
and made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Exclusive remedy.
Out-of-state lands.
Exclusive remedy.
Thu. statute provides the exclusive remedy
for securing a deficiency judgment following a
sale of real property under a trust deed,
thereby precluding the pursuance of any other
remedy once the sale has been made. Cox v.
Green (Utah 1985) 696 P.2d 1209.

Out-of-state lands.
Deficiency judgment protection requiring
that fair market value of property at time of
sale be used as setoff is not extended to debtors
whose obligations are secured by trust deeds on
land outside Utah Bullington v. Mize, 25 Utah
2d 173, 478 P.2d 500, 44 A.L.R.3d 910 (1970).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59 C J.S. Mortgages § 599.
Key Numbers. — Mortgages <s= 375.
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Utah

743 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

CONCEPTS, INC., a Utah corporation,
and Ray Fry, individually, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES,
INC., a Utah corporation, formerly
known as Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation, a Utah corporation, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 20144.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 1, 1987.

Trustors under trust deeds executed
and delivered for development of real property brought action seeking declaratory
judgment that trustee's sale conducted under power of sale provision in trust deed
was valid, and that trustee was precluded
from rescheduling second sale of same
property. The Third District Court, Summit County, Philip Fishier, J., held that
trustee's sale was void, and trustors appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1)
validity of sale was not affected by minor
typographical error in publication of notice
of foreclosure sale which stated that sale
would take placp in previous year, and (2)
trustee's failure to bring deficiency action
within three months after sale of property
terminated all of trustors' remaining obligations.
Reversed.

1. Mortgages <3=>369(7)
Party who seeks to have trustee sale
set aside for irregularity, want of notice, or
fraud has burden of proving his contention,
it being presumed, in absence of evidence
to contrary, that sale was regular.
2. Mortgages <3=>369(2)
Defects in notice of foreclosure sale
that will authorize setting aside of sale
must be those that would have effect of
chilling bidding and causing inadequacy of
price.

3. Mortgages <S=>354
Notice of trustee's foreclosure sale
was not rendered invalid by fact that publication dated 1983 stated that sale would
take place in 1982. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-25.
4. Mortgages 0=375
Trustee which purchased property in
foreclosure sale could not bring deficiency
action three months after sale, where validity of sale was not affected by minor typographical error in publication of notice of
foreclosure sale. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-25.
5. Mortgages <3=>369(2, 3)
Sale once made will not be set aside
unless interests of debtor were sacrificed
or there was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing.
6. Mortgages 0=335
Maker of deed of trust with power of
sale may condition exercise of power upon
such conditions as he may describe.
7. Mortgages <s=375
Once trust deed sale has been made,
trustee's exclusive remedy for deficiency is
to institute deficiency action within three
months of date of sale. U.C.A.1953, 57-128(2), 57-1-32.
B. Ray Zoll, Tom D. Branch, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
James Gilson, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action, declaring a trustee's sale conducted under a
power of sale provision in a trust deed void
as a matter of law for failure to comply
with section 57-1-25 of the Utah Conveyances Act. We reverse.
Plaintiffs were trustors under trust
deeds executed and delivered to defendant
for the development of real property into
the Park West Condominiums in Park City.
Utah. The amount of the loan exceeded
$3,000,000. When plaintiffs failed to perform under the trust deed notes and loan
agreements, defendant filed a notice of de-
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fault On September 14, 1983, plaintiffs
were served with a notice of sale to beheld
on October 28, 1983. In compliance with
statutory requirements, the notice was also
posted on the property to be sold and in
three public places in Summit County. Defendant also caused the notice to be published in the Salt Lake Tribune on October
3, 10, and 17 of 1983, as evidenced by an
affidavit of publication. The notice was
dated "This First Day of October 1983"
and stated that the property "will be sold
. . . at the Summit County Courthouse . . .
on October 28, 1982
" (Emphasis added.) Defendant was the only purchaser
and bidder at the sale. Although neither
party has apprised this Court of the
amount of the bid, it is our understanding
that defendant bid an amount substantially
less than the outstanding balance due under the notes. The trustee passed title to
viefendant by virtue of a trustee's deed.
On April 2, 1984, and April 30, 1984,
plaintiffs were served with a ten-da} summons advising them that an action had
been commenced to "recover deficiency due
under notes dated November 17, 1981, and
February 2, 19S2." An affidavit in the
record indicates that plaintiffs' attorney refused to stipulate to the timeliness of the
action l and was informed by counsel for
defendant that a sale of the property would
be rescheduled because of the typographical error in the Salt Lake Tribune notice
misstating the year of the sale. This action ensued, with claims for declaratory
relief, injunction, and damages.
The parties stipulated that the facts were
not in dispute and that the sole legal issue
before the trial court was the validity of
the sale on October 28, 1983. Because
disposition of a case by summary judgment
denies the benefit of a trial on the merits,
we review the facts and inferences in the
hfcTht most favorable to the party against
whom the judgment was granted. Atlas
Corp. v. The Claris National Bank, 737
P.2d 225 (Utah 1987). Where, as here,
summary judgment is granted as a matter
of law rather than fact, we are free to
1. Section 57-1-32 of the Utah Conveyances Act
requires an action to recover the balance due
upon the obligation for which the trust deed

reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. Id.; Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick
Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475 (Utah
1986).
[1,2] The purpose of strict notice requirements in a nonjudicial sale of property
secuied by trust deed is to inform persons
with an interest in the property of the
pending sale of that property, so that they
may act to protect those interests. Morrell v. Arctic Trading Co., Inc., 21 Wash.
App. 302, 5S4 P.2d 983 (1978). The objective of the notice is to prevent a sacrifice of
the property. If that objective is attained,
immaterial errors and mistakes will not
affect the sufficiency of the notice or the
sale made pursuant thereto. Russell v.
Webster Springs National Bank, 164
W.Va. 708, 265 S.E.2d 762 (1980). A party
who seeks to have a trustee sale set aside
for irregularity, want of notice, or fraud
has the burden of proving his contention, it
being presumed, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that the sale was regular.
Id. Defects in the notice of foreclosure
sale that will authorize the setting aside of
the sale must be those that would have the
effect of chilling the bidding and causing
an inadequacy of price. Boyce v. Hughes,
241 Ga. 357, 245 S.E.2d 308 (1978). The
remedy of setting aside the sale will be
applied only in cases which reach unjust
extremes. McHugh v. Church, 583 P.2d
210 (Alaska 1978).
With these guidelines before us, we examine the case at hand. The parties do not
dispute the fact that the statutory notice
requirements were strictly observed, except that the notice by publication dated
October 1, 19S3, stated that the sale would
take place on October 28, 1982. Errors like
these do not normally operate to vitiate a
foreclosure sale. Russell, supra (sale was
advertised for 10:00 a.m., EDT, on November 4, when on that date EST was in effect.
Held: no substantial departure from provisions of trust deed or notice of sale as to
vitiate sale); Love 11 v. Rowan Mutual Fire
Insurance Co., 46 N.C.App. 150, 264
was given as sccuri'v to be commenced within
three months after the sale of the property under trust deed.
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S.E.2d 743 (1980), rev'd on other grounds,
302 N.C. 150, 274 S.E.2d 170 (1981) (notice
of foreclosure hearing was improperly given as 3 January 1978 when sent in December of 1978. Held: obviously inadvertent
error was not enough to invalidate proceedings); Hankins v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 92 Nev. 578, 555 P.2d 483
(1976) (sale was erroneously advertised to
;ake place in North Las Vegas. Held: proceedings were not invalidated as plaintiffs
were not misled by mistake); Bailey v.
Pioneer Federal Savings and Loan Association, 210 Va. 558, 172 S.E.2d 730 (1970)
(first notice by publication left out place of
sale. Held: substantial compliance with
the requirements of the trust deed was
sufficient, so long as parties were not affected in a material way); Holzman v.
Bristol County Savings Bank, 277 Mass.
383, 178 N.E. 622 (1931) (notice stated that
sale would be held June 9 "at 10 o'clock in
the forenoon." The year was left out.
Held: no one was likely to be misled by the
omission from the notices in what year the
sale was to take place). But, where the
erroneous date had the effect of not advertising the sale at all, the court held that
presumably no one was informed of the
actual date. Booker v. Feaeral Land
Bank of New Orleans, 175 Miss. 281, 164
So. 877 (1936).
[3] The facts here are similar to those
in RasselL Loveli, and Holzman. The language of the notice by publication is in
futuro, advising the public that the sale
wrill be held at a future date. As such, it
can hardly be argued, nor does defendant
argue, that the notice confused bidders or
resulted in an undervaluation of the property. Defendant's statement that the incorrect date had the potential to mislead prospective bidders is insufficient to conclude
that it in fact did.
[4] Defendant received the trustee's
deed after the foreclosure sale of October
28, 1983. Though the presumption of validity of sale is not conclusive and may be
rebutted, Houston First American Savings v. Mustek, 650 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.1983),
section 57-1-28(1) of the Utah Conveyances
Act states that recitals in a trustee *s deed
averring compliance with statutory requirements constitute prima facie evidence of

such compliance and are conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers and
encumbrancers for value and without notice. See also Triano v. First American
Title Insurance Co. of Arizona, 131 Ariz.
581, 643 P.2d 26 (1982). Defendant does
not argue that it did not pay value, nor that
it had notice of any irregularities in the
foreclosure proceedings at the time of sale.
Nonetheless, defendant now argues that as
beneficiary under the trust deed and purchaser at sale, it was not qualified as a
bona fide purchaser, so as to be entitled "to
rely on the recitals in the deed he receives
from the trustee after the sale" (citing
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 303
(Utah 1978)). Although we agree that defendant was not a bona fide purchaser,
that fact does not change the result in this
case.
[5,6] Defendant's argument that the
flaw in the notice by publication invalidated
the sale to it perverts and uses as a sword
a statute that was meant to shield the
property rights of a trustor/ A sale once
made will not be set aside unless the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or there
was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing. McHue v. Church, 583 P.2d at 215,
216. The maker of the deed of trust with
power of sale may condition the exercise of
the power upon such conditions as he may
describe. Houston First American Savings, 650 S.\V.2d at 768. Indeed, defendant
itself, in its memorandum in support of
motion for summary judgment, as well 3S
in its argument before this Court, repeatedly concedes that the right to set aside a
trustee's sale is predicated upon the impairment of the trustor's rights to the property. "Publication notices protect the debtor's interest [and serve] to ensure the fairness of the sale through competitive bidding, thus securing the highest possible
prices" (citing Comments, Validity of Poller of Sale and Procedural Considerations
in Its Exercise, 16 U.Kan.L.Rev. 611. 617
(1968)). The reason for strict compliance
with the statute "is to protect the property
of the debtor'1 (citing University Savings
Association v. Springwood Shopping Center, 644 S.\V.2d 705, 706 (Tex.1982)). "The
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grantor of the power is entitled to have his^
directions obeyed; to have the proper notice of sale given; to have it to take place
at the time and place, and by the person
appointed by him" (citing Houston First
American Savings, 650 S.W.2d at 768, and
quoting from Fuller v. O'Neal, 69 Tex.
349, 6 S.W. 181 (1887)). "The right of a
grantor of a deed of trust to have its
provision strictly complied with to effect a
valid foreclosure sale is absolute" (citing
Harwath i\ Hudson, 654 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.
App.1983)). "Statutes making recitals in a
trustee's deed conclusi\e evidence of their
truth, may operate to deprive the trustor
(or those claiming under him) of property
without due process of law, i.e., the opportunity for an individualized hearing" (citing
P. Basye, Clearing Land Titles § 43, at
165-69 (19S3 Supp.)). (All emphases ours.)
[7] In short, there is nothing in defendant's argument that would persuade us to
adopt defendant s reasoning. The statutes
governing foreclosure sales under trust
deeds protected the interests of plaintiffs
up to the moment that the property was
sold and a trustee's deed issued. Thereafter, the trustee's deed operated to comey
to defendant, without right of redemption
by plaintiffs, title to the property of plaintiffs and all parties claiming under them.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-2^2) (1986). Defendant thereafter had three months to institute action to recover any balance due on
the obligation for which the trust deeds
were given as security. Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-32. Once a trust deed sale has
been made, that remedy is the exclusive
remedy under statute. Cox v. Green, 696
P 2d 1207 (Utah 1985).
\\ e hold that the trustee's sale on October 28, 1983, va> properly advertised and
that the notice published in the Salt Lake
Tribune substantially complied with our
statutory requirements. Inasmuch as the
\ahdit\ of the sale was not affected by the
minor typographical error, the trustee's
leed validly convened to defendant all cf
plamtifis' right, title, and interest in the
property, subjec: only to plaintiffs' contuuil
ng liability ior any remaining deficiency,
defendant's failure to bring a deficiency
action within three months after the sale of

the property terminated all of plaintiffs'
remaining obligations, and defendant's attempt at rescheduling the same property
for a second sale was improper as a matter
of law.
The judgment is reversed.
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice,
having disqualified himself, does not
participate herein.
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TRUE-FLO MECHANICAL SYSTEMS,
INC., Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, Department of Emplo\ment Security, Defendant.
No. 860281.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 9, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 21, 1987.
Board of Review of Industrial Commission found that electrical contractor was
successor for purposes of charging predecessor's unpaid unemployment benefit
costs to electrical contractor's account m
determining contractor's contribution rate.
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that'
(1) contractor "acquired" substantially all
assets of its predecessor for purposes of
charging predecessor's unpaid unemployment benefit costs to contractor's account,
even though contractor leased assets from
actual purchasers; (2) evidence that predecessor advised Department of Employment
Security to close its employer's accourt
following sale of its assets, together with
evidence that predecessor filed wage report
for last quarter showing no payroll, was
sufficient to support finding of Eoard of
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count" regulations are promulgated not in
conformity with the applicable provisions
of the A.P.A. 22
Reversed and remanded.
FITZGERALD, J., not participating.

O
^

I KEf MUMBER SYSTEM
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b

Steve E. B. COOPER, d/b/a Cooper Excavating & Construction Company,
Appellant,
v.
Charles L. CARLSON and Margaret J.
Carlson, Appellees.
No. 1769.

Supreme Court of Alaska.
July 16, 1973.

Lessors brought action against lessee
to recover 15 cents per cubic yard of gravel
removed by lessee in addition to $1,000 fee,
specified in written lease and for lessee's
alleged abuse of legal process and interference with private property. The lessee
filed a counterclaim for interference with
his leasehold interests. The Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks District, Gerald J.
VanHoomissen, J., rendered judgment generally in favor of the lessee but refused to
award lessee costs and attorney's fees and
the lessee appealed. The Supreme Court,
Boochever, J., held that where trial court
ruled in lessee's favor on central issue of
the case, lessee was the "prevailing party"
and was entitled to award of costs even
though he did not prevail on argument that
judgment should have been entered for
22. Appellee has expressed the concern that
"[i]f the early count procedure must be
enacted by the promulgation of regulations pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, then the remainder of the
Lieutenant Governor's instructions are
also subject to attack on the same basis."
Since only the regulations implementing
the "early count" statute were challenged
511 P.2d—82V*

nominal damages for lessors* interference
with his leasehold interest,
Remanded.

1. Costs <£=32(3)

In action instituted by lessors against
lessee, where lessee prevailed on central
issue of whether lease agreement constituted the complete agreement between parties and trial court held that lessee had paid
full price due under contract and had acted
properly in securing assistance of state
troopers and moving lessors' cattle truck
which blocked access to property, lessee was
the "prevailing party" and was entitled to
award of costs even though lessee did not
prevail on argument that he was entitled
to nominal damages for lessors' interference with his leasehold interest.
AS
09.60.010; Rules of Civil Procedure, rules
54(d), 82(a).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Costs 0 3 2 ( 3 )

Party may be the "prevailing party"
within rule pertaining to award of costs
if he is successful with regard to the main
issues in the action. AS 09.60.010; Rules
of Civil Procedure, rules 54(d), 82(a).
3. Appeal and Error C=>984(5)
Costs C=>I72

Award of attorney's fees is discretionary with trial judge and is reviewable
on appeal only for abuse of discretion.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 82(a)(1).
4. Costs C=>I72
Though award of attorney's fees to
prevailing party is not mandatory, denial
of motion for such fees may not be arbitrary or capricious or result from imin the instant action, we decline to consider the validity of other election regulations which may not have been promulgated in conformity with the A.P.A. We
note, however, that the promulgation of
such latter election regulations in compliance with the A.P.A. could easily be
accomplished by the lieutenant governor
prior to the next general election.

J 3 0 6 A^ska
p r o p e r motive.
rule 8 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) .
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Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e ,

Joseph \V. S h e e h a n , of Rice, H o p p n e r ,
Blair & Associates, F a i r b a n k s , for appellant.
E d w a r d A. Merdes, of M e r d e s , Schaible,
Staley & DeLisio, F a i r b a n k s , for appellees.
OPINION
Before R A B I N O W I T Z , C. J., C O N NOR,
ERWIN,
FITZGERALD
and
BOOCHEVER, JJ.
I. The following cases involved \ a n o u s aspects of questions pertaining to the award
of attorneys fees: Macn v. United
States, ,353 F 2 d S04 (9th Cir. 1965);
Ma2vo v J. C Pestier Co, lac, 512 P2d
575 (Alaska, 1973) ; Hodges v. Mock, 501
P 2 d 1355 (Alaska 1972); De Witt v.
Liberty Leasing Co. of Alaska, I n c , 499
P.2d 509 (Alaska 1972) ; State v Abbott, 49$ P 2 d 712 (Alaska 1972);
Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C R. Lewis
C o , I n c , 497 P 2d 312 (Alaska 1972);
Miller v Wilkes, 496 P 2d 176 (Alaska
1972) ; Stauber v. Granger, 495 P 2d 67
(Alaska 1972) ; H a r t v. Wolff, 489 P 2d
114 (Aliska 1971); Ferrell v. Baxter,
484 P 2 d 250 (Alaska 1971); Palfy v.
Rice. 473 P2d 606 (Alaska 1970) ; Connelly \ Peede, 459 P 2 d 362 (Alaska
1969); Froehcher v. Hadley, 442 P 2 d
51 (Alaska 1968) ; Dale v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough, 439 P 2d 790
(Alaska 196S) ; Beauheu v. Elliott, 434
P 2d 665 (Alaska 1967) ; Albntton v.
Estate of Larson. 428 P 2d 379 (xUaska
1967) , McDonough v. Lee, 420 P 2d 459
(Alaska 1966) ; Kenai Power Corp. \ .
Strandberg. 415 P 2d 659 (Alaska 1966) ;
Patrick v. Sedwick, 413 P 2d 169 (Alaska
1966) ; Decker v Aurora Motors, I n c ,
409 P2J 3D3 /AtesX* lS>8d) ; Preferred
General Agency of Alaska, Inc. v. Raffetto, 391 P2d 951 (Aliska 1964) ; Davulsen v. Kirkland, 362 P 2d 1068 (Alaska
1961).
2. Alaska Civ R. 54(d) provides:
Costs. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute
of the state or in these rules, costs shall
be allctced as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court othericise directs
The procedure for the taxing of costs
by the clerk and review of his action
by the court shall be governed by Rule
79. (Emphasis added.)

B O O C H E V E R , Justice.

This case p r e s e n t s a n o t h e r facet of the
often p e r p l e x i n g problems involving the
a w a r d of costs a n d a t t o r n e y ' s fees under
applicable A l a s k a l a w . 1 Cooper contends
t h a t he was the " p r e v a i l i n g p a r t ) " within
t h e rneaning of this c o u r t ' s interpretation of
A S 00 60.010 and A l a s k a Civil Rules 54(d)
a n d 8 2 ( a ) , and t h a t it w a s an abuse of discretion for the trial j u d g e to r e t u s e to
a w a r d costs and a t t o r n e y ' s fees. 2
T h e suit a r o s e out of a dispute over the
p r i e s to be paid for gravel t a k e n from the
C a r l s o n s ' property by t h e Cooper E \ c a \ a t Alaska Civ R. S2(a) p r o v i d e Allouance to Prevailing Party
as Costs.
(1) Unless the court, in its discretion, ot/icrwfse <(ireeti, the following
Schedule of attorney's fees will be adhered to in fixing su( li tees for the
tmrty recovering anv monev judgment
therein, as part of the costs of the action allowed bv l a w :
Attorney's Fees in \ierage
Cases
WithNonConout
Contested Trial
tested
First $2,000
25%
20%
15%
\ T ext $3,000
20%
1 5 % 12 3 %
T
\ ext $5,000
1 5 % 12 3 %
10%
Over $10,000
10%
7.5%
5%
Should no recoien/ be had, attorney's
fees for the prevailing party may be
fixed by the court as a part of the costs
o/ the action, in its discretion, m a
reasonable amount.
(2) In actions where the monev judgment is not an accurate criteria [sic]
for determining the fee to be allowed
to the prevailing side, the <ourt shall
^ward a fee commensurate with the
Amount and value of legal services
rendered.
(3) The affowance of attornev's fees
by the court in conformance with the
foregoing s< hedule is not to be construed as tixing the fees between attorney and client. (Emphasis added )
A&j 09 60 010 provides:
Costs allowed pi evading party
Except as otherwise provided bv statute,
*he biipreme court shall detei mine by
h
ule or order what costs, if any, iniludhig attorney fees, shall be alloucd the
brevaihng party m any case.
(Emphasis added.)
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ing and Construction Company.
The
gravel was used to perform resurfacing
and upgrading of the Remington Road, near
Delta Junction, Alaska, pursuant to a contract with the State of Alaska.
The Carlsons maintained that in addition
to the $1,000 lease fee specified in the
written lease, Cooper had orally agreed
to pay 15? per cubic yard for the gravel
removed. The evidence established that
94,850 cubic yards of gravel were removed
from the Carlsons' property.

was no duty to pay 15e" per cubic yard for
the gravel removed or to give an accounting.
The judge found that Carlson had in fact
blocked Cooper's access to the property,
and that Cooper had secured the assistance
of two state troopers and had moved the
cattle truck. He found that Cooper had a
right to do this, however, since the blockage was a "wrongful interference with defendant Cooper's lease interest in said
property".

In addition to suing for this alleged contract price for the gravel, the Carlsons
maintained that when they had tried to close
the gate to their property (after Cooper had
refused to give an accounting or payment
for gravel removed) and had placed their
cattle truck across the roadway to the
property, that Cooper had secured the assistance of two state troopers who interceded on his behalf without any legal process or authority. They also maintained
that Cooper had used an earth moving machine to move the cattle truck, and then
immobilized it by piling gravel around it.
For these actions, they asked for $25,000
in punitive damages.

With respect to the counterclaim, the
court found that there was in fact an interference by Carlson with a valid lease-hold
interest of Cooper, but that no damages due
to this interference were shown.
* In conformity with these findings of fact
and conclusions of law, the trial judge
held that the Carlsons were to take nothing by way of Counts I and II of their
complaint, and that Cooper was to take
nothing by way of his counterclaim. Cooper moved for an order awarding costs and
attorney's fees, and an entry of judgment
awarding nominal damages on the counterclaim. This motion was denied.

By way of answer, Cooper maintained
that the written lease was the full and complete agreement with respect to the gravel
removed from the property. Thus, he
maintained that $1,000 was all that was
due, and that it had been paid. He denied
the claims of abuse of legal process (use
of state troopers) and interference with
private property (immobilizing the cattle
truck). In addition, in an amended answer filed after a pretrial conference,
Cooper filed a counterclaim for interference with the Company's leasehold interests.
While the trial jr.dge did find that the
Carlsons were the legal owners of the
property and that the lease agreement was
ambiguous, he also found that the wfritten
lease was the full and complete agreement
with respect to the taking of gravel. Since
the $1,000 was paid, he held that Cooper
was in proper possession of the property
during the incidents at issue, and that there

The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in
failing to award costs and attorney's fees
to Cooper. We thus do not reach the question of whether the court should have
awarded nominal damages on the counterclaim.
The trial court did not set forth its reasons for refusing to award costs and attorney's fees. It is conceivable that the
court concluded, as is argued by the Carlsons, that Cooper was not the prevailing
party due to his failure to secure an award
of damages on his counterclaim for interference with his leasehold rights. On the
other hand, the court may have considered
that Cooper was the prevailing party, but
that in the exercise of discretion an award
of costs and attorney's fees should be denied.
When the central issues of the case and
the trial court's resolution of them are considered, it is clear that Cooper was the pre-

1308

Alaska

511 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

vailing party. Cooper prevailed on the central issue of the lease agreement constituting the sole and complete agreement between the parties with respect to removing
the gravel. Thus, it was held that he had
paid the full price due under the contract,
was properly in control of the property and
did not have to give an accounting. He '
prevailed on the issue of the validity of
his actions in securing the assistance of
state troopers and in moving the cattle
truck. Cooper also prevailed on the issue
of whether there was an improper interference with his leasehold interest by Carlson in blocking access to the property.
Thus, the only question Cooper failed to
prevail on was the argument that the judgment should be entered for nominal damages where there is an interference with
a leasehold interest and no evidence of
damages.
[1,2] Even though Cooper did not prevail on that one subsidiary issue, it is clear
from this court's previous interpretations
of the Civil Rules that a party may be the
"prevailing party" if he is successful with
regard to the "main issues in the action".
The leading case in this regard is Buza v.
Columbia Lumber Co., 395 P.2d 511 (Alaska
1964). In the lower court, Columbia had
sued Buza for both compensatory and
punitive damages for conversion of logs
and trespass. Buza had counterclaimed for
the value of the logs. Columbia prevailed
on its claim for conversion but did not receive any additional damages. The counterclaim of Buza was denied. With respect
to the contention that the award of costs
to Columbia was error since it did not recover the full amount of relief prayed for,
this court stated at page 514:
It is true that Columbia did not recover
the full measure of the relief it had
prayed for but it was nonetheless the
prevailing party and the only prevailing
party. Judgment was entered for Columbia, declaring it to be owner "of the personal property covered by this law suit"

and ordering the appellants' counterclaim
dismissed with prejudice.
The dictionary states that "prevailing
applies esp. to that which is predomi^ nant," and it has been established by case
law that the prevailing party to a suit
is the one who successfully prosecutes the
action or successfully defends against
it, prevailing on the main issue, even
though not to the extent of the original
contention. He is the one in whose favor
the decision or verdict is rendered and
the judgment entered. (Footnotes omitted.)
The most recent case to follow Buza v.
Columbia Lumber Co. is the 1972 case of
DeWitt v. Liberty Leasing Co., 499 P.2d
599 (Alaska 1972). In the court below,
DeWitt had received a judgment on a construction contract claim of $17,736.11 and
Liberty Leasing had prevailed on a counterclaim to the amount of $93.64. In reversing the trial court's determination that neither party was entitled to costs or attorney's fees, Justice Erwin stated for the
majority: 3
In Buza v. Columbia Lumber Co., 395
P.2d 511, 514 (Alaska 1964), this court
discussed the meaning of the term "prevailing party" . . .. Applying this
standard to the case at bar, appellant
clearly prevailed in the litigation below . . . . A s we stated in Nordin
Const. Co. v. City of Nome [sic], 4S9
P.2d 455, 474 (Alaska 1971), "[a] simple
balancing of the recovery in favor of
each party makes it clear that [appellant]
was the prevailing party in this law suit.
. . . " Moreover, appellant prevailed
on most of the issues disputed at trial.
(Footnotes omitted.)
The Carlsons contend that the counterclaim could have involved damages far in
excess o f those of the plaintiff's claim.
Since the court found that no damages had
been proved under the counterclaim, the)
argue that they should be regarded as the

3. Accord, Nordin Constr. Co. v. City of Nome, 4S9 P.2d 455, 474 (Alaska 1971).
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prevailing party or, in the alternative, that
neither party prevailed.
In Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C. R.
Lewis Co., 497 R2d 312 (Alaska 1972), we
held that a litigant who is successful in defeating a claim of great potential liability
may be the prevailing party even though the
other side is successful in receiving an affirmative recovery. In that case Lewis
successfully defended against a contract
claim of SI 19,663.12. Recovery against
Lewis was permitted in quantum meruit for
material salvaged in the amount of $7,363.12, but it was clear that Lewis had prevailed on the principal issue.
In the instant case, Cooper prevailed on
every liability issue, and was unsuccessful
only in his argument that he was entitled
to nominal damages on his counterclaim.
As indicated above, we thus conclude that
he was the prevailing party.
As the prevailing party he was entitled to
an award of costs. AS 09.60.010 specifies
that "the supreme court shall determine
by rule or order what costs, if any, including attorney fees shall be allowed the
prevailing party. . . ." Alaska Civil
Rule 54(d) specifies that "[e]xcept when
express provision therefor is made either
in a statute of the state or in these rules,
costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court othenuise
directs."
(Emphasis added.)
In DeJVitt we stated:
We do not decide whether a denial of
all costs would be justified in an extreme case of a vexatious prevailing party
4. 499 P.2d 599, 602 n. 13.
5. In Albritton v. Estate of Larson, 42S P.
2d 379 (Alaska 1967) (involving attorney's fees where the issue was an offer
of judgment under Rule 68), the court
stated through then Justice Rabinowitz:
As we have noted, Civil Rule 82(a)
provides for the allowance of attorney's
fees as costs to "the party recovering
any money judgment," to "the prevailing party," and "to the prevailing side."
In our view, we need not decide whether, under the circumstances of this rec-

unreasonably prolonging the litigation
and substantially increasing its costs.
The trial court in such a case would at
least be justified in disallowing particular items on the cost bill as unnecessary
to the litigation. (Citations omitted.) 4
The trial court has set forth no reasons
for its refusal to award costs. Although
it may be argued that the filing of Cooper's
counterclaim for interference with its leasehold rights was unnecessary in view of
the facts that the lease had terminated and
that ii- > damages were proved, we do not believe that this is an appropriate case to
authorize a denial of all costs to the prevailing party. The counterclaim raised a
peripheral issue only. Since the case will
have to be remanded in any event, the
trial court should determine whether particular items on the cost bill should be disallowed as unnecessary to the litigation,
but should award proper items of costs.
With reference to the more difficult question pertaining to the disallowance of attorney's fees, Cooper was the prevailing
party. Nevertheless, the trial court in its
discretion for valid reasons might deny
the award of attorney's fees. Alaska Civil
Rule 82(a)(1) specifies in part:
Should no recovery be had, attorney's
fees for the prevailing party may be
fixed by the court as a part of the
costs of the action, in its discretion, in a
reasonable amount. (Emphasis added.)
[3] We have recognized in several
cases that the award is discretionary with
the trial judge 5 and is reviewable on appeal
only for abuse. 6
ord. appellants were prevailing parties
within the meaning of Civil Rule 54(d)
and Civil Rule 82(a)(1). Assuming
that appellants were the prevailing parties, in the circumstances under which
the question was presented to the trial
judge for determination, he wa^ vested
with wide discretion as to whether attorney's fees should be awarded.
On the record in this appeal we cannot say that the superior court abused
its discretion in failing to award at6. See note 6 on page 1310.
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In the case of M - B Contracting
Co., Inc.
v. Davis and Albritton v. E s t a t e of L a r s o n , 7
valid reasons w e r e set forth for d e n y i n g
the allowance of a t t o r n e y ' s fees. In the
M - B C o n t r a c t i n g Co., Inc., case the employer prevailed, a n d in a f f i r m i n g the trial
c o u r t ' s failure to a w a r d a t t o r n e y ' s fees
against Davis (the c l a i m a n t - e m p l o y e e ) we
stated:
T h i s is not a s i t u a t i o n in which it
might h a v e been said t h a t the injured
employee has appealed on
frivolous
grounds and should t h e r e f o r e be penalized by the t a x a t i o n of an a t t o r n e y ' s
fee against him.
I n s t e a d , it was the
employer w h o had p r o s e c u t e d the appeal,
in this case rightly so, but thereby placing the employee in a position w h e r e he
h a d to engage counsel t o r e p r e s e n t him
in the superior c o u r t on w h a t w a s then.
a debatable question
oi l a w . 8
tomey's fees to appellants.
(Emphasis
added, footnotes omitted.)
A similar result was reached in M-B
Contracting Co., Inc. v. Davis, 399 P.2d
433, 437 (Alaska 1965) where the court
upheld the refusal to award fees to the
"prevailing party" :
The appellant's claim of entitlement to
attorney's fees as the prevailing party
presents a somewhat different problem.
In Civil Rule 82 is published a schedule
of attorney's fees to be adhered to by the
court in fixing such fees as a part of the
costs of the action for the party recovering a money judgment therein, "[u]nless the court, in its discretion, otherwise
directs
. " Then there is added
this short paragraph:
"Should no recovery be had, attorney's fees for the prevailing party
may he fixed by the court as a part
of the costs of the action, in its discretion, in a reasonable amount." (Emphasis added by court.)
The wording of this paragraph leaves
it in the sound discretion of the trial
court to decide, first of all, ichether the
prevailing party should receive an attorney's fee at all .
The appellant recognizes the broad discretion vested in the superior court by
Civil Rule S2 in the matter of awarding
attorney's fees, but urges that the court
abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in withholding from the
prevailing party an attorney's fee. Xo
sufficient showing has been made, nor do

In the Albritton
case, it was held that the
trial c o u r t h a d p r o p e r l y refused to award
a t t o r n e y ' s fees d u e to the t e r m s of the
stipulation the p a r t i e s had e n t e r e d into. 9
[4] W h i l e this c o u r t h a s m a d e it clear
t h a t the a w a r d of a t t o r n e y ' s fees to the
prevailing p a r t y is not m a n d a t o r y , it is
equally clear t h a t t h e denial of a motion
for such fees m a y not be a r b i t r a r y or capricious or for some improper motive.
T h e most recent s t a t e m e n t of the necessity
of a reasonable basis for d e n y i n g the motion is c o n t a i n e d in D e W i t t v. Liberty
L e a s i n g Co., 499 P.2d 599, 602 (Alaska
1972). J u s t i c e E r w i n cited t h e language
of P r e f e r r e d G e n e r a l A g e n c y of Alaska,
Inc. v. R a f f e t t o , 391 P.2d 951, 954 (Alaska
1964):
T h e p u r p o s e of Civil Rule 82 in prov i d i n g for the allowance
of
attorney's
we find one in the record, that the trial
judge abused his discretion in denying an
attorney's fee to the appellant.
(Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.)
6. With regard to what constitutes an abuse
of discretion, this court has stated:
[T]he matter of awarding attorney's
fees is committed to the discretion of
the trial court. We shall interfere with
the exercise of that discretion only
where it has been abused. An abuse
of discretion is established where it appears that the trial court's determination as to attorney's fees was manifestly unreasonable. (Footnotes omitted.)
Palfy v. Rice, 473 P.2d 606,
613 (Alaska 1970).
In that case, the court held that an award
of $3,700 to a party who had successfully
defended a suit (i. e., no "money judgment") was "unreasonably low" due to
the factually complex nature of the suit,
the three and one-half years of preparation, the potential liability, the three
weeks of trial, and collateral actions that
were necessary for discovery.
7. Cited in note 5, supra.
8. M-B Contracting Co., Inc. v. Davis, 399
P.2d 433. 437 (Alaska 106o). The case
involved special considerations applicable
only to certain provisions of the Alaska
Workmen's Compensation Act (AS 23.30.145).
9. Albritton v. Estate of Larson, 428 P.2d
379 (Alaska 1967).
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necessary to remand the case to the trial
fees is to partially compensate a prevailing party for the costs to which he has court for the purpose of making a ruling
been put in the litigation in which he was as to allowable costs and also to determine
involved. The rule was not designed to whether attorney's fees should be allowed
or denied in its discretion, in which event
be used capriciously or arbitrarily, or
as a vehicle for accomplishing any pur- the reasons for exercising such discretion
should be set forth.
pose other than providing compensation
where it is justified. (Footnote omitted.) 1 0
On this basis, the court held that there was
not sufficient evidence to support the denial
as a penalty for prolonging the litigation.
There may be valid reasons why the
trial court in its discretion refused to award
Cooper attorney's fees. 11 As indicated previously, the court might have found that
Cooper's counterclaim was interposed for
the purpose of delay or confusion. The
court might also have been affected by the
equities of the situation. 12 The court
found that a binding contract had been
entered into between the parties whereby
Cooper took about $13,800 worth of gravel
from the Carlsons' property and paid them
only $1,000. While not finding the contract unenforceable or modified by the alleged oral agreement to pay an additional
15c" per yard, the court could have found
it unconscionable to allow an additional
sum for attorney's fees resulting from the
Carlsons presenting a legitimately arguable
claim. Similarly, the court could have
considered that Cooper having prevailed on
his highly favorable contract, should not
also receive a "pound of flesh". 13
We are confronted with the difficulty of
not knowing whether the court denied the
fee in the exercise of its discretion or under
the mistaken belief that Cooper was not the
prevailing party. Accordingly, we find it
10. See De Witt v. Liberty Leasing Co.,
499 P.2d 599, 602 n. 12 (Alaska 1972),
for other cases citing this language.
11. There may be valid reasons other than
those mentioned in this opinion for the
exercise of the court's discretion.
'2. We realize that referring to "equities"
presents a rather ephemeral standard dependent upon the sense of justice of the
individual presiding. We do not intend
to imply that in each case the court

The case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
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Elinor B. AYDLETT, Appellant,

v.
Dale HAYNES and Howard C. Aydlett,
Appellees.
No. 1762.

Supreme Court of Alaska.
July 13, 1073.

Spouse of serviceman driving automobile involved in three-vehicle collision
brought suit against all three drivers, including her husband. After entry of judgment for plaintiff, her husband's motion to
reduce amount awarded by amount allowed
by jury for medical expenses was granted
by the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Edward V. Davis, J., and
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court,
Fitzgerald, J., held that where plaintiff had
no independent and enforceable right to receive medical services from military medical facilities, collateral source rule did not
apply to services received from such facilishould evaluate the purity of color of the
chargers on wl ch each side rides. We
are well aware that judges may have
difficulties in color perception, or even
be color blind. Nevertheless, there are
cases involving substantial litigable questions in which to require the losing party
to pay a sizeable attorney's fee would obviously be unwarranted.
13. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice,
Act IV, Scene 1.
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OWEN JONES & SONS, INC., formerly
Jones Enterprises, Inc., and Empire Western Ltd., formerly Western Ltd., d/b/a
Jones-Western, a joint venture, Appellants,
v.
C. R. LEWIS COMPANY, Inc., Appellee.

No. 1460.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
May 19, 1972.

Contractor sued subcontractor for recovery of progress payments on basis that
contract provided for indemnification of
contractor and subcontractor counterclaimed for services rendered in installing
plumbing in apartment building before it
was destroyed by earthquake. The Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Eben H. Lewis, J., held that collapse
of building discharged subcontractor's obligation to furnish further performance and
that subcontractor was entitled to compensation for its performance and subcontractor was liable for the amount by which
value of its performance was exceeded by
the amount of contractor's materials it salvaged and the progress payments and ordered that subcontractor be awarded costs
and attorney's fee, and contractor appealed.
The Supreme Court, Connor, J., held that
where subcontractor was prevailing party,
award of $10,000 attorney's fee to subcontractor was not abuse of discretion in view
of potentially large liability of subcontractor.
Affirmed.
Boney, C. J., and Erwin, J., did not
participate.

09.60.010; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
54(d).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Costs C=>32(2)

Determination of which party prevails
and is entitled to costs is within discretion
of trial judge. AS 09.60.010; Rules of
Civil Procedure, rule 54(d).
3. Costs C=332(5)

Where, subcontractor, in action by
contractor against subcontractor for recovery of progress payments, was entitled to
compensation on quantum meruit basis for
installing plumbing but was liable for the
amount by which value of its performance
was exceeded by amount of contractor's
materials salvaged by subcontractor and
progress payments, subcontractor was prevailing party and entitled to costs. AS 09.60.010; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
54(d).
4. CostsC=>l72

Where subcontractor was prevailing
party in action by contractor against subcontractor for recovery of progess payments, award of $10,000 attorney's fee to
subcontractor was not abuse of discretion
in view of potentially large liability of subcontractor. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
82(a) (2).

E. G. Burton and Richard A. Helm,
Burr, Pease & Kurtz, Inc., Anchorage,
for appellants.
Karl S. Johnstone, Nesbett & Johnstone,
Anchorage, Lyle L. Iversen, and Josef
Diamond, Lycette, Diamond & Sylvester,
Seattle, Wash., for appellee.
Before RABINOWITZ, CONNOR and
BOOCHEVER, JJ.

I. Costs <S=>32(2)

The party who obtains an affirmative
recovery must be considered the "prevailing party" within statute and rule authorizing award of costs to prevailing party. AS

OPINION
CONNOR, Justice.
This is an appeal from an award of
costs and attorney's fees granted to appel-
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lee at the conclusion of this action in the
superior court.

obligation on the subcontractor's part to
furnish further performance.

Appellants, Owen Jones & Sons, Inc.
and Empire Western Ltd., a joint venture,
entered into a subcontract agreement with
C. R. Lewis Company, Inc., appellee, on
July 3, 1963. Under the contract appellee
agreed to furnish labor and materials necessary to complete plumbing and other systems specified in the plans for the "Four
Seasons Apartment" to be built in Anchorage, Alaska. The total contract price was
$178,449.19. The contract also provided
for progress payments, not to exceed 90%
of the contract price.

After finding that the building's destruction discharged the obligation of the parties under the original contract, Judge
Lewis held that C. R. Lewis Company was
entitled to recover the cost of its performance from appellants on a quantum meruit
basis.
The trial court decided that the subcontractor's services and materials supplied
should be reasonably valued at approximately $142,300. From this figure a computation was made which took into account
the
amount
of
progress
payments
($119,663.12) and the value of materials
belonging to appellants which were salvaged by appellee ($30,000), representing a
total value received by appellee of
$149,663.12. From this total was subtracted the amount due to the appellee under
the quantum meruit theory employed by
the court, which left an excess of $7,363.12,
the amount of judgment for appellants.
Pursuant to this judgment the trial judge
ordered that appellee be awarded costs and
$10,000 attorney's fee.

The partially completed "Four Seasons
Apartment" was destroyed in the March
27, 1964, earthquake. After the quake the
appellants brought an action against appellee to recover $119,663.12 that Jones-Western had disbursed to C. R. Lewis Co. as
progress payments. This claim was made
under a clause of the contract calling for
indemnification of the contractor by the
subcontractor for all damages caused "by
reason of the elements, from any other
person or any other craft". The subcontractor counter-claimed for $46,620.92 for
services rendered and materials furnished
before the collapse.
At trial without a jury the superior
court accepted Jones-Western's contention
that the earthquake was within the indemnity clause of the contract, but the court
held that this finding did not resolve the
case, [t was the decision of the trial court
that there could be no indemnification under the contract to supply plumbing to the
"Four Seasons Apartment" because the
building, the subject matter of the contract,
had been destroyed, thus discharging any
1. "Costs allowed prevailing party. Except
as otherwise provided by statute, the supreme court shall determine by rule or order what costs, if any, including attorney
fees, shall be allowed the prevailing party in any case."
2. "Costs. Except when express provision
therefor is made either in a statute of the
497 P.2d—20V*

The resolution of this controversy requires our decision on two issues. First,
was it error to hold that appellee was the
prevailing party in this action; and second, did the trial court abuse its discretion
in the amount of the award given ?
Under AS 09.60.010 1 and Rule 54(d), 2
Rules of Civil Procedure, it is clear that
the prevailing party is entitled to costs.
It is the contention of the appellants that
only they could be considered the prevailing parties in light of their affirmative recovery of $7,363.12 at the conclusion of the
trial.
[1,2] With this contention we cannot
agree; it is not an immutable rule that the
state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs. The
procedure for the taxing of costs by the
clerk and review of his action by the court
shall be governed by Rule 79."
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party who obtains an affirmative recovery
must be considered the prevailing party. 3
The decision of the trial court that appellee was the prevailing party did not involve an erroneous construction of either
AS 09 60.010 or Rule 54(d). We are of
the opinion that the determination of
which party prevails in cases of this sort
is, like the award of attorney's fees, within
the discretion of the trial judge. 4
[3] This case is clearly distinguishable
from Buza v. Columbia Lumber Company,
395 P2d 511 (Alaska 1964). In Buza we
affirmed an award of attorneys fees to
plaintiff and held that he was the prevailing party within the terms of the statute
and rule, even though he did not obtain refief to the extent urged in his compfaint.
The mam issue in that case was the ownership of a quantity of logs, and the plaintiff proved his right to the logs although
he was not able to obtain compensating or
punitive damages.
The instant case differs because the recovery of appellants was based only on an
accounting for materials salvaged by the
appellee. 5 It was clear that the main issue
had been resolved against appellants when
the court found that appellee had no obligation to refund its progress pa>ments under the contract, the obligation having
3

Haugland v. Canton, 250 Minn. 245, S4
X.\V2<1 274 (Minn 1957) : Milner \. XPW
Edmhurg School Disc, 2: l Af£ 3o7. 200
S.W.2d 319 (1947); Xull \. Board of
Comm'rs, 98 Okl. 16, 224 P. 159 (1924) ,
Wymer v. J>ngm)]o, 162 X.W 2t) 514
(Iowa 1968) ; MtXrarv v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 84 F 2d 790, 795 (8th Cir.
1936).

4. The following Alaska oases hold that the
award of attorney's fees is within the
discretion of the trial judge. McDonough
v. Lee, 420 P 2d 459 (Alaska 1966) ; Preferred General Agency ot Alaska, Inc. v.
Raffetto, 391 P.2d 951, 954 (Alaska
1964).

been discharged by destruction of the subject matter.
[4] Because we are of the opinion that
the trial court was correct in deciding that
the appellee was the prevailing party, we
must also decide whether the amount of
the award was proper.
Under Rule 82(a) (2), Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court is empowered to
"award a fee commensurate with the
amount and \alue of legal services rendered" when "the money judgment is not
an accurate criteria [sic] for determining
the fee to be allowed."
It is clear from the record in this case
that the court considered the efforts of appellee's counsel in defeating the appellants'
cfaim for Si 19,663.12 ana the \afue of that
effort in determining the amount of the attorneys fee awarded. The trial judge also
considered the potential liability that
threatened appellee.6 Finally, it is clear
that the amount of attorney's fee was
within the sound discretion of the trial
court and such an award will not be disturbed unless ;he court has exceeded that
discretion." We find no reason to disturb
the award in this case.
Affirmed.
BOXEY, C. J., and ERWIN, J., not participating.
5. This reco\er\ based on the accounting can
be classified as an incidental recovery
which will not he a sufficient reooverv to
bar a partv who has defended a large
claim fiom being considered a prevailing
[urtj.
ILuigland i. Canton, 250 Minn.
245. S4 X.\V2d 274 (1957); Milner v.
New IMinburg School Dist., 211 Ark. 337,
200 S.W2d 319 (1947); Null \. Board
of Comm'rs. 9S Okl. 16, 224 P. 159 (1924).
6. Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250. 271
(Alaska 1971).
7. See oases cited note 4, supra.

